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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, the cousin of Denial of Service 
(DoS), paralyse their target resource and on occasion inflict permanent 
damage, preventing it from serving its legitimate users. DoS (Denial of 
Service) has long been a method of cyber attack to render a host unavailable to 
its users through the use of various methods that either consume the victims 
resources or force it into a reset. Either way the target host is unable to serve 
it's legitimate users. More recently DDoS attacks have become popular, 
commonly in the form of SYN flooding and exploitation of the HTTP GET 
method. The majority of DDoS attacks make use of a bot-net, using a large 
group of unwillingly infected computers that can be unknowingly commanded 
to carry out a DoS attack on a specific target. IP spoofing commonly used in 
such DDoS attacks makes it difficult for attacks to be traced, this paper will 
look at the problems faced by victims of DDoS and proposes a new method of 
finding the origin of attack when the IP has been spoofed. The proposed 
method builds upon current techniques of tracing the attack back and 
uncovering the perpetrator's IP by reconstructing attacks paths and 
computationally comparing them to identify false positives in the trace. This in 
turn will provide a more accurate trace back path to the perpetrator with the 





  Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, the cousin of Denial of Service 
(DoS), paralyse their target resource and on occasion inflict permanent 
damage, preventing it from serving its legitimate users, (Landesman, 2010). 
One popular type of DDoS attack is carried out by utilising the TCP handshake 
to packet flood the host, sending constant malformed SYN(synchronise) 
requests, a simple but effective technique. Normally a client would send one 
SYN request to the host who would then return a SYN ACK with the client 
finally replying with an ACK and thus a connection is establish. This can be 
abused by sending a multitude of SYN requests to a host in which the 
malicious client can skip the final sending of ACK or spoof its IP to which the 
server replies using an incorrect address. The targeted host will wait a degree 
of time for the ACK to arrive, potentially using up resource's on the server 
which if enough malformed requests are made can render it unable to serve. 
This type of attack is thus called a 'resource depletion attack’.  
   Often used in DDoS is the Botnet (although not exclusively tied to DDoS 
attacks) this is a large number of computers all connected to the internet and in 
some way infected with malware. A single individual or master can take 
control of a proportion of these 'slave' system's resources without the owner’s 
knowledge. Botnet's can potentially become huge distributed systems, one 
recent example is that of the 'Bredolab' botnet consisting of as many as 29 
million infected computers (Constantin, 2010), botnets of this size or smaller 
provided a large amount of power in the hands of an individual. It should be 
noted however that a DDoS can still be performed without a botnet through a 
group willing to co-operate with one another to DoS a host. Such applications 
of DDoS attacks are; cyberwarfare, internet protests, attacking competing 
businesses, political gain, and personal vendettas to name but a few. To express 
the threat of DDoS some examples include the recent attack on Burma's 
connection to the wider web, ("Burma hit by", 2010) an attack on various 
Estonian websites including the Ministry of Finance in 2007 (" Bots Hammer", 
2007) and the historical attack on Yahoo disabling the service for 3 hours in 





   Such attacks can have severe consequences for the victim and although 
routes are available to avoid and withstand them, the ultimate deterrent would 
be to quell the source of the attack. The problem in finding the culprit of a 
DDoS attack is that it is distributed among many sources with each packet 
routed independently, the origin IP can be easily spoofed and no details on the 
path traversed by a packet are recorded, anyone behind a botnet would thus be 
hard to trace back too. Current Traceback methods to find the true sources of 
an attack when an IP is spoofed are reviewed. Such methods are 'Link Testing' 
(hop-by-hop): tests network links that carried the attack packets starting with 
the router closest to the origin, Logging: packets at key routers are logged then 
using data mining techniques information is extracted, ICMP trace-back: in 
addition to regular traffic information, details on a packets source, sender and 
authentication is received for 1 in every X number of packets, Packet marking: 
uses a packets IP header to place trace-back details of the routers it has passed 
through (Aljifri, 2003). The focus of this paper is the use of packet marking 
and the problems this entails, with a look at current solutions to the packet 
marking problems and solution.  
 
 
Figure 1. (Aljifri, 2003, p.28) "Packet marking. The router probabilistically 
marks packets as they travel through it (by inserting an indication of the router 
IP address). The marking process depends on the method adapted. "  
 
 
   Figure 1 illustrates the basic concept of packet marking. As each packet 
passes through a router, the router marks the IP packet with trace-back data, 
upon reaching the victim of the attack the host will have enough information to 
re-construct an 'attack path' revealing the source of attack (Aljifri, 2003). 
Figure 1 demonstrates how a packet can be traced. The attack from source 1 
passes through Router 1 (RI), R4 and R6 and at each stage of its journey it is 
being marked by these routers. Savage et al (2001) states that all marking 
algorithms have two components, marking procedure and path reconstruction 
with the former being performed by routers marking packets and the latter by 
the victim using the marked packets to attempt a reconstruction of the attack 
path. Savage et al (2001) also provides an example algorithm of the simplest 
form of packet marking in figure 2:  
 
Figure 2. (Savage et al, 2001, p.230) "Node append algorithm"  
 
Marking procedure at router R:  
for each packet w, append R to w  
 
Path reconstruction procedure at victim v:  
for any packet w from attacker  
extract path (Ri .. Rj) from the suffix of w  
 
 
   The inherit problem of such an algorithm and one of the original problems of 
packet marking, occurs when the router addresses are stored in the 'options' 
field of the IP header. Due to the inability to predict the length of route taken 
by the packets you cannot make sure sufficient space will be available, as each 
hop increases the packet size and the chance of fragmentation occurring if the 
packet size breaches the MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) size set out. 
Regardless if you were able to predict the number of hops on a route, attackers 
could still fill the header with fake data (Savage et al, 2001). The problem 
comes when trying to find a new approach to packet marking that maintains the 
accuracy of packet marking but without the huge amounts of fragmentation or 
large overheads.   
 
Known Solutions  
  
   Savage et al, (2001), presents a new type of packet marking, probabilistic 
packet marking (PPM), which has since gained widespread attention due to its 
potential low cost (AIjifri, 2003). In brief the basic principle of PMM 
constitutes marking each packet with the probability of 1/25 significantly 
driving down overhead. In greater detail Savage et al (2001), proposed that 
routers mark the packets with their IP address (node sampling) or the edges of 
the attack path (edge sampling), using PPM. Node sampling gives each router a 
probability to mark packets with their IP, the aim is for the victim to receive 
enough packets marked by each router to reconstruct the attack path. An attack 
path is reconstructed by ordering the routers by the number of packets that they 
have marked, with the theory being the furthermost router has little probability 
of one of its marked packets making it untouched to the victim, thus the fewer 
marking received from a router the further down an attack path it must be. 
Figure 3 shows the node sampling algorithm:  
   Edge sampling still using a probabilistic approach records the start and end of 
a path (an edge) method. Each packet contains a field for the start and end 
addresses as well as a counter for the distance from start to end. The first router 
in a path that decides to mark the packet's start address with its own increments 
the distance to 0, the next router checks if the distance is >=0 it then sets the 
end address to its own and increments the distance by one. The victim will end 
up with the start and end addresses in the attack path along with the distance 
between them. Edge sampling improved upon node sampling in regards of 
lowering the router overhead, which compression techniques.  
 
Figure 3. (Savage et aI, 2001, p.230) "Node sampling can be improved upon 
further with algorithm" 
Marking procedure at router R:  
for each packet w  
let x be a random number from [0 .. 1)  
if x < p then,  
write R into w.node  
  
Path reconstruction procedure at victim v:   
 let NodeTbl be a table of tuples (node,count)   
 for each packet w from attacker   
  z := lookup w.node in NodeTbl   
  if z != NIL then   
   increment z.counl    
else   
   insert tuple (w.node,l) in NodeTbl   
  sort N odeTbl by count   
extract path (Ri .. Rj) from ordered node fields in N odeTbl  
 
 
   The drawbacks and problems facing PPM are those such as; false positives 
(when a router appears in the reconstructed attack path but not the real attack 
path), packets being marked that are not part of the attack or marking occurring 
without an attack present, large reconstruction time of the attack path and the 
large amount of attack packets needed to make an accurate path (Tupakula et 
al, 2006). One large problem relating to the context of DDoS, is when PPM is 
used against DDoS attacks due the difficulty in trying to group together 
multiple attack paths and the large amounts of fragments to sort through to 
structure an attack path, with false positives only adding to this (Savage et aI, 
2001). Research by Song et al (2001) finds that while using a compression 
technique formulated by Savage et al (2001) for PPM, DDoS attacks from as 
little as 25 sources, can incur days of reconstruction to produce an attack graph.  
   An early solution to PPM, concerned with solving the high computation 
overhead in attack path reconstruction and the large number of false positives 
experienced when under attack by DDoS, is presented by Song et al (2001). 
The technique that Song et al (2001) purposes named 'Advanced Marking 
Scheme' (AMS) uses hash values to encode router IP's into packets, adapting 
on the previous compression methods for edge sampling designed by Savage et 
al (2001) which encoded router IP address into eight fragments. The first 
scheme advocated by Song et al uses the 16 bit ID field of a packet by using 5 
bits to represent the distance and 11 bits for the paths 'edge', this still produces 
a significant amount of false positives when the number of attacker's rise above 
60. 
   To improve upon the first scheme a second is devised in which two sets of 
independent hash functions are used, when tested in a simulation this method 
produced only 20 false positives when under attack by 2000 separate attackers 
and reproduced an attack path in only 100 second a vast improvement upon 
Savage's design. This method however has not stood the test of time, with the 
increase in the size of DDoS attacks like the earlier reported 29 million strong 
botnet, an attack of hundreds of thousands would be enough to create a 
significant number of false positives under the advanced marking scheme to 
threaten the legitimacy of an attack graph.  
   Yaar A, Perrig A and Song D (2005) worked on a new theory (FIT: Fast 
Internet Traceback) in an attempt to further decrease false positives, 
computational overhead, packets required for path construction and various 
other issues in AMS. Contrasting with AMS, FIT makes use of node sampling 
instead of edge sampling, allowing each attack path router to be recorded rather 
than just the edge's, the advantage being a reduction in false positives and less 
packets required for path reconstruction. The IP ID field is used again to mark 
packets, this time split into a 1 bit distance field, 2 bit fragment field and a 13 
bit hash field, the 1 bit used for distance is unlike most PPM based schemes 
which commonly use 5 bits, this essentially allows 13 bits for the hash field 
thus reducing again the number of false positives. FIT also provides a tool for 
the creation of the up-stream router map, improving upon the accuracy of the 
commonly used Traceroute (known as tracert in Microsoft WIndows) tool 
which proves "inaccurate in the presence of asymmetric paths" (Yaar et al, 
2005, p.1398) as the victim to potential attacker path traced by Traceroute can 
differ from the potential attacker to victim path. Previous instalments of PPM 
have faltered when confronted with legacy routers that do not increment the 
hop count resulting in numerous false positives, Yaar et al (2005) have 
provided a solution by calculating the distance from when the packet was last 
marked, setting the 5 least significant bits of a packets time to live (TTL) to a 
global constant and storing the 6th bit of the TTL in the distance field, the next 
FIT enabled router can then calculate the distance the packet has travelled. 
   In an attempt to improve upon the above scheme Akyuz et al (2009) puts 
forward the idea of marking packets with dynamic probabilities based on their 
distance from the source. Using TTL again to determine distance, packets far 
from the source will have a lower probability of being marked, opposing those 
closer will have a higher probability, this results in a fairer marking scheme 
evenly distributing the amount of packets marked per router. When tested in a 
simulation Akyuz et al (2009) found the number of packets required to 
reconstruct an attack path of 25 hops was 498, marginally less than the 565 
required in a FIT implementation. However this scheme did not improve on the 
number of false positives generated, as in a simulation of 5000 attacker's this 
scheme had 11 false positives 4 more than when using FIT. Akyuz et al 
attributed this down to the fact that 5 bits are used, keep a counter of the 
distance, leaving less for the hash than the l3bits used by FIT.  
   One key issue that these solutions keep on suffering from is that of false 
positives, not only a problem when trying to reconstruct an attack path but also 
when carrying out legal action against attacker's as Tupakula et al (2006 p.ll8) 
claims "If the victim initiates legal proceedings with the evidence captured 




Quality Assurance Check for the Attack Path  
 
   Missing from the current solutions is a way to validate the resulting attack 
path. This paper proposes a quality assurance check for the attack path, 
calculated using the FIT method in an attempt to find and reduce the few false 
positives it produces. The checking method would need to be a lightweight 
implementation such that it does not require large changes to be implemented 
and provides a simple method of attack path reconstruction.  
 
   A method which best fills this criteria is one by Thing et al (2007). The aim 
of the method titled 'Non-Intrusive IP Traceback for DDoS Attacks' is to 
provide a simple and efficient means to attack path reconstruction. Supported 
by evidence that end to end routes remain relatively stable this method 
conducts what is referred to as the 'learning process', while in this stage 
samples of the common flow of traffic between source and destination are 
cached in a white list 'caching device'. In the first onset of an attack the white 
list stops updating the cache and removes a set amount of previous entries to 
make up for the time it took to detect the attack (attack data would corrupt the 
white list). As explained by Thing et al (2007, p.371) "When an attacker spoofs 
a legitimate source address, the packet may pass through routers which are not 
on the normal source-destination routing path" this occurrence is used to 
reconstructed the attack path. To reconstruct the attack path cached data from 
the white list is compared to the collected attack data, the comparison reveals 
instances of when packets have diverged from their usual path onto paths not 
commonly used to carry the related source-destination IP addresses. From this 
we can devise the true source of spoofed IP packets.  
   Such a method as the one above meets the 'lightweight' criteria as it does not 
require routers to be changed or modified, instead as an alternative to installing 
tools on routers, monitoring devices can be placed along network paths, the 
white list caching devices can also provided relief for the victim from logging 
and computation tasks but most importantly changes do not need to be made to 
packets travelling through the network as they do not need to be marked. One 
concern could be that the marking of packets performed by the FIT method 
would conflict with the 'lightweight' method, however the markings are made 
in the identification field and the source/destination IP fields used in the 
'lightweight' method are left unaltered.  
   Due to this simple nature it can be implemented alongside a complex form of 
trace-back such as FIT. At the end of trace-back both FIT and the 'lightweight' 
method produce an attack graph, showing the routers conversed by the attack 
packets, it is these two attack graphs that is to be investigated. By cross 
referencing the two attack graphs it would be possible to highlight the false 
positives encountered in both, these false positives are routers appearing in the 
attack path when in reality they do not belong there. False positives are 
produced differently in each method, in FIT they are a result of the hash based 
recording of router addresses being mismatch in the reconstruction process, 
where as the false positives in the 'lightweight' approach are usually caused by 
new legitimate traffic that has not yet been added to the white list, causing 
routers to flag-up that they are carrying unfamiliar packets.  
   The advantage of the differences in false positive creation for both of these 
methods is that the same false positives should not be generated both trace-
back techniques, allowing for the victim to essentially 'weed' out the incorrect 
attack paths by picking up on discrepancies between the two reconstructed 
attack paths. When the falsified data is removed the victim should be left with 
the combination of the two attack paths and the correct sequence of routers 














Figure 4, FIT generated attack path, 
A * are potential attackers, R * are 
routers, red meaning false positive; 
green is the correct attack path.  
 
Figure 5, attack path generated by 
the lightweight method, A * are 
potential attackers, R * are routers, 
red meaning false positive; green is 
the correct attack path.  
 
  
    
Figure 4 and 5 show how the false positives will stand out when a comparison 
is made. It is clear that the correct attack path is Rl>R2>R7 as it appears in 
both reconstructions thus R3, R6 and R5 are false positives.   
 
Figure 6, Pseudo code for comparing the methods to detect false positives 
dataCollection() 
while (atkData is undetected) 
 whitelistState="updating cache" **No attack, whitelist continues to update cache 
  If (atkData is dectected) then 
   whitelistState="paused updating"   
  whitelist.rollback  
  while (atkData is dectected) 
   blacklistState="collecting attack data" 
   markedPackets = "recording packets marked by FIT"}  
  pathReconstruction(blackList, markedPackets) 
 
pathReconstruction(blackList, markedPackets) 
 atkGraph1 = FIT's reconstructed attack path 
 atkGraph2 = whiteList and blackList comparison of data 
 comparison (atkGraph1, atkGraph2) 
 
comparison(atkGraph1, atkGraph2) 
 for (number of routers) 
  If (router*.flag in atkGraph1 != router*.flag in atkGraph2) then 
   router*="false positive" 
   **Router is a false positive as it does not appear in both attack graphs  
  else 
   add router* to finalGraph 
 
Figure 6, illustrates the algorithm to compare the attack path paths of both FIT 
and the lightweight method to detect false positive which will highlight the 
origins of the attack. False negatives, if one were to occur, meaning either 
method failed to pick up on a router carrying attack data. It would not make it 
through the comparison stage as it would be seen as a false positive and deleted 





   Looking at the potential risks DDoS attacks present to various parties, from 
governments to businesses, we can recognise the need for a viable method to 
trace DDoS attackers, but as described the problems of tracing back such 
attacks can be difficult due to IP spoofing. One popular attempt at DDoS trace-
back called packet marking, in which packets moving from attacker to victim 
are marked with path information. The problem which such a method was it 
has a large computational overhead, and when reducing this it becomes 
difficult to maintain the accuracy in the tracing of attack packets to source. We 
have looked at the three main solutions to such a problem each building upon 
the previous method in both accuracy (fewer false positives) and overhead.  
   In this paper a unique solution to trace-back was presented, the basis of 
which was to take the Fast Internet Trace-back method in its entirety and 
combine it with a second method of trace-back, one which was simplistic and 
did not rely on packet marking. Such a simplistic and efficient method was 
Thing et al’s 'Non-Intrusive IP Traceback'. The two methods of trace-back can 
be allowed to run their course, with their resulting reconstructed attacks paths 
being compared against one another. When comparing attack paths any false 
positives should be easily spotted as they likely hood that both methods would 
produce the same one's is significantly reduced.  
   This combined approach to trace-back allows victims to reduce the number 
of false positives more so than when using the standard single trace-back 
approach. The 'lightweight' method is flexible enough that it can be combined 
with almost any other method, FIT was chosen as an example in this paper as it 
produced the least false positives of any other packet marking approaches. 
False negatives, when routers on the correct attack path are not detected, could 
potentially have an adverse effect on the purposed method as a router could 
appear in one of the attack paths to be compared but not on the other due to a 
false negative, resulting in the false negative being marked as a false positive 
thus being removed. Secondly although unlikely it is still possible for both 
attack graphs to produce the same false positive, resulting in this false positive 
making it into the final reconstructed attack path. In conclusion this method of 
trace-back has gone some way in solving the problem of false positives but still 
remains vulnerable to false negatives, work would need to be performed on this 
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